Abstract. Recently, Lu et al. have proposed two image search schemes based on additive homomorphic encryption [IEEE Access, 2 (2014), 125-141]. We remark that both two schemes are flawed because: (1) the first scheme does not make use of the additive homomorphic property at all; (2) the additive homomorphic encryption in the second scheme is unnecessary and can be replaced by a more efficient symmetric key encryption.
Introduction
Recently, Lu et al. [1] have discussed how existing additive homomorphic encryption can be potentially used for image search, and proposed two confidentiality-preserving image search schemes based on Paillier's encryption [2] . In the proposed model, a client has many images who wants to store the image data online for convenient data access anywhere anytime. The client has to encrypt each image and its features and upload the encrypted data to a cloud server. In this note, we remark that the Lu et al.'s schemes are flawed.
Review of the Lu et al.'s schemes
In the schemes [1] , the features of each image are encrypted by any additively homomorphic encryption such as Paillier's cryptosystem [2] , which can be described as follows. Pick an RSA modulus n = pq. Set λ = lcm(p−1, q −1). Select g ∈ Z * n 2 such that n | ord n 2 (g). Publish n, g and keep λ in secret. For m ∈ Z n , pick r ∈ Z n , compute the ciphertext c = E(m) = g m r n mod n 2 .
mod n. Denote the encrypting function and decrypting function of AES by E(·) and D(·), and that of Paillier's cryptosystem by E(·) and D(·), respectively. See Table 1 and Table 2 for the details of the two image search schemes. 
Store the encrypted and E(P (i) ). Upload them.
images and features.
Given an image Q and its feature vector q, ask for all the encrypted features.
Return all encrypted features.
Compute 
Store the encrypted
Given an image Q and Compute its feature vector q,
send q to the server. 
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Notice that, by the additive homomorphic property of Paillier's encryption, we have
Analysis of the Lu et al.'s schemes
We now show that the Lu et al.'s schemes are flawed.
(1) The authors [1] have confused the general arithmetic over the field R and the modular arithmetic over the domain Z n . In fact, the correctness of the schemes are based on
(3) In the scheme 2, the server has to make use of the additive homomorphic property for computing the encrypted distance h i = E f (i) − q 2 . But in such case, the client has still to compute d i = D(h i ), i = 1, · · · , N , which dominate the client's computational cost. Compared with the revised scheme, we find, the scheme 2 has not truly mitigated the client's computational cost. See the Table 3 for the comparisons of the dominated computations for the client in the three schemes.) Apparently, the revised scheme is more efficient because it only needs to perform symmetric key decryption N + |I| times. 
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Conclusion
We show that the Lu et al.'s schemes for image search are flawed and somewhat misleading. We here want to stress that the computational performance of public-key encryption is inferior to that of symmetric-key encryption. A homomorphic encryption allows anyone to perform some computations on encrypted data, despite not having the secret decryption key. But any computations performed on encrypted data are constrained to the underlying domain (finite domains). The real goal of using modular arithmetic in cryptography is to obscure and dissipate the redundancies in a plaintext message, not to perform any numerical calculations.
